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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
1\.\THERINE IRENE DEARDEN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
Case
No. 9952

-vs.-

.\LBERT ERROL DEARDEN,
Defendant a.nd Respondent.

AP·P'ELLANT''S BRIEF
NATURE OF THE CASE
The ease on appeal herein involves a divorce action
wherein plaintiff sought a decree granting her a divorce
from defendant and also awarding her the care, custody,
and control of the minor child of the parties, subject to
tht.' right of reasonable visitation privileges of defendant, plus alimony and child support in a designated
amount. Defendant filed a Counterclaim against plaintiff seeking against plaintiff the same relief she sought
:1g-ainst him.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Fifth Judicial District Court (Judge C. Nelson
Day) g-ranted a deeree of divorce in favor of defendant and
1
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against plaintiff and awarding defendant the care, custody and control of the minor child of the parties with
the right of reasonable visitation in plaintiff for the reason and on the grounds that the plaintiff is not a fit and
proper person to have custody of the child and because
it is in the best interests of the minor child that such a
judgment be decreed.

RELIEF SOUGHT
The relief sought in this appeal is as follows:
A. Reversal of the lower Court's decision.
B. Reversal in part of the lower Court's decision
and an Order awarding plaintiff the care, custody and
control of the minor child of the parties, with the right
of reasonable visitation of defendant.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff, Katherine Irene Dearden, age 22 years
(T-6), and defendant, Albert Erroll Dearden, age 24
years (T-4) were married on May 26, 1956, at Sugarville,
Millard County, State of Utah (T-7). One child has been
born as issue of said marriage, viz. a girl, Julie Kay
Dearden, age 2 years, having been born on December 24,
1960 (T-7). At the time of the trial, plaintiff and the
minor child of the parties were living separate and apart
from defendant a.t 64 "F" Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.
Plaintiff was employed as a waitress at the Post House
Cafe in Salt Lake City. Defendant, who is a truck driver
2
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for \Vycoff Company (T-49), was residing with his parPnt~ in Fillmore, Utah. Prior to their separation in Octoht>r, 1~Hi~. plaintiff and. defendant lived together with their
minor child in Fillmore, Utah.
During the course of the marriage, plaintiff worked
in order to obtain income for family purposes. :M:ost of
thi~ employment was as a waitress in Fillmore, Utah
(T-11, 12, 13, 14). Plaintiff claims that she worked at
the suggestion and with the acquiescence of defendant
and because he thought it was best inasmuch as they
W('l'e getting further in debt (T-32), and defendant admits that he had no objection to her working (T-70). All
of the income acquired by plaintiff was used for payment
of household expenses.
In October of 1962, plaintiff and defendant separated,
plaintiff going to Delta, Utah, and then to Salt Lake City
to seek employment to care for herself and her little
girl. Defendant remained in Fillmore.
In November, 1962, plaintiff filed an action in the
District Court of Millard County seeking a divorce from
defendant on the grounds of mental cruelty and also
secki11g to have the permanent custody of the minor
child awarded to her, subject to the right of reasonable
visitation of defendant. Defendant Counterclaimed for
divorce and custody of the minor child. The matter was
tried before the Honorable C. Nelson Day in the District
Court of :Jiillard County on April10, 1963, and after taking the matter under advisement, Judge Day granted
3
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defendant a decree of divorce against plaintiff and
awarded defendant the custody of the minor child, subject to the right of reasonable visitation of plaintiff.

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING
GRANT PLAINTIFF A DECREE OF
VORCE AGAINST DEFENDANT AND
GRANTING DEFENDANT A DECREE
DIVORCE AGAINST PLAINTIFF.

TO
DIIN
OF

The case before the Court at this time is a divorce
action involving a dispute between plaintiff and defendant over the permanent custody of Julie Kay Dearden,
their minor daughter, aged 2 years. Although it is true
in divorce cases, that the Supreme Court will not disturb
the trial Court's judgment in the decision of property,
awards of alimony, and child support unless it appears
to be unjust and inequitable, Tsoufakis v. Tsoufakis,
______ Utah ______ , 382, P. 2d 412 (1963), yet the Court may and
will ·review the facts as well as the law on appeal in
child custody controversies between divorced parents.
Sa.m.psell v. Holt, 115 Utah 73, 202 P. 2d 550 (1949), and
plaintiff prays the Court to review the facts on appeal
herein and reverse the lower Court on the basis thereof.
The trial court found as a matter of fact that plaintiff "is not entitled to a divorce from defendant upon
the grounds stated in her Complaint or otherwise."
(Findings of Fact- P. 8.) In that regard, the grounds
4
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for plaintiff'~ Complaint of divorce were acts of mental
ertwlty committed by defrmlant during the course of the
ma rringP. Plaintiff testified at the trial, and her testimony was uncontroverted in this, that while she was
living with defendant and on several occasions, some as
latt- as October, 1962, defendant (1) told plaintiff to get
ll divon'P hut she would have to get a lawyer and pay
t'or it (T-9) - (2) told plaintiff that he had known for
a long time that the marriage wouldn't work, that he had
wanted to get rid of her for a long time and that the
only reason he stayed with her was because he felt he
was obligated to her (T-9), and defendant testified that
he does not recall but he may have told plaintiff this
(T-95, 96) - (3) told plaintiff he didn't care where she
WPnt or what she did as long as she didn't take the little
girl with her (T-10) and he didn't want plaintiff around
(T-10) - ( 4) told plaintiff that he did not want the baby
(T-10) and that plaintiff should see a psychiatrist (T-10).
This conduct on the part of defendant during the course
of the marriage and just prior to the separation of the
partil's so distressed the plaintiff and caused her such
mental anguish that she cried on each occasion and she
was unable to carry on her usual activities because of
the wa~- defendant's conduct made her feel (T-10). It
was further testified by plaintiff that the difficulty between plaintiff and defendant first began approximateJvr
the time their child was born (T-22), and that it continued thereafter until the action was filed. Defendant
asserts that after plaintiff left their home in Fillmore
and when he took her to the home of her parents in Delta
that he. defendant, asked Earl Sheehy, plaintiff's father,
5
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for advice on the problem that had arisen in the marriage and Mr. Sheehy advised that the young couple get
away from defendant's parents and make a life for themselves (T-87). Defendant, apparently thinking this was
sound advice, said he had intended to do that but his wife
left before he could take this action {T-87). Yet, knowing that Mr. Sheehy's advice was sound in suggesting
that plaintiff and defendant get away from the latter's
parents in order that their difficulties be solved and their
marriage possibly salvaged thereby, defendant objected
to plaintiff's wanting to ''get away" for a while to go
with her parents to Kansas on a vacation in an attempt
to save the marriage (T-25, 27)
It was only after the divorce action had been initiated
in this matter and after the relationship had deteriorated
beyond recovery that defendant desired to see a marriage
counselor with plaintiff (T-28).
While it is true that what constitutes cruelty causing
mental distress depends upon the facts and circumstances
of each particular case, Stevenson v. Stevenson, 12 U.
2d 153, 369 P. 2d 923 (1962), the Courts usually grant
the wife a decree of divorce on the ground of cruelty on
much less evidence than they do the husband, Doe v. Doe,
48 U. 200, 212, 158 P. 781, and in dealing with actual cases
involving cruelty, the courts recognize that the nature
and disposition of the plaintiff, as well as the conduct of
the defendant, are important factors. Button v. Button,
95 Ore. 578, 188 P. 180. It takes a person of very little
perception to realize that women, generally speaking,
6
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are much more sensitive about matters of love, marriage,
and things pertaining to the affections than are men. In
tlw matter on appeal herein, plaintiff testified that the
aet ions of her husband caused her mental anguish, that it
was t4cvere enough to cause her to shed tears and had
such an effect on her physically that it interfered with her
normal activit~, of being a wife and mother. Plaintiff
asserts herein that unless the woman is callous, any
wife and mother would have reacted as she did if told
what defendant told plaintiff about his feeling for her
and the marriage and that such actions are in fact cruel
treatment causing great mental anguish and grief and
that, ns plaintiff testified in this matter, defendant's conduct did in fact cause her great mental suffering and
emotional strain because she was interested in saving
her marriage and holding the family unit intact.
The Court found from the testimony at the trial of
this matter that the charges of cruel treatment causing
mental distress and adultery by plaintiff were sustained
hy the eYidence. However, plaintiff urges upon this Court
that such a finding, especially as to adultery, is not justified from the evidence in this matter. It is true that evidence relating to adultery is nearly always circumstantial
heenuse the act is generally done in secret and is not
susceptible to proof; but it is frequently said by the
Courts that the circumstantial evidence must be of a clear
and positiYe nature. Marshall Y. Marshall, 3 F. 2d. 344,
;)5 App. D. C. 173; Brazen v. Brown., 27 Idaho 205, 148 P.
4J: Diehl Y. Diehl, 87 Pa. Super. 545, and although a clear
preponderance of the evidence is necessary to establish
7
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the act, there is a presumption of innocence on the part
of the alleged offender and if the party's conduct is open
to an interpretation of either innocence or guilt, the presumption of innocence will prevail. Ovenru v. Ovenu,. 201
Ill. App. 607; Hutzlerv. Hutzler, 161 La. 823,109 So. 504;
Germarn v. Germ.a(J1;J, 137 Md. 424, 112 A. 789; McCrary v.
McCrary, 230 S.W. 187 (Tex. Civ. App). To prove adultery circumstantially, as was done in the instant case, it
is not enough to prove that there was an adulterous disposition or that there was an opportunity to commit adultery, but the concurrence of both disposition and opportunity must be shown. Allen v. Allen, 285 F. 962, 52 App.
D. C. 228; Grundy v. Grundy,. 92 N. J. Eq. 687, 114 A.
552; Torrens v. Torren.s, 94 N. J. Eq. 480, 120 A. 189;
J acobstein. v. J acobstein, 209 App. Div. 846, 204 N.Y.S.
918, affirmed 240 N.Y. 693, 148 N.E. 761. See also Cooley
Ca.s. Person.s ood Domestic Relations (2nd Ed.) 142.
The basis for the Court's finding of adultery on the
part of plaintiff was the testimony of B. F. Romano of
Paramount Detective Agency of Salt Lake City who was
hired by defendant to conduct surveillance activities of
plaintiff between December 27, 1962, until January 14,
1963. Mr. Romano, a private detective, testified that
he and a companion observed plaintiff, Mr. Leo Brunson,
and plaintiff's apartment continually from the dates
indicated. The essence of his testimony is that every day
with the exception of approximately two, plaintiff and
the said Brunson left her apartment at about 6:30 o'clock
.a.m. and returned each evening or they would be back
in the apartment each evening when the detectives re-
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their surveillance aetivities at about 6:00 o'clock
p.m. ( '1 -100-1:~~). J\1 r. Romano asserted that he occupied
an npart nwn t in another building north of plaintiff's
apart metd: but at about the same height. He asserted
that he observed the activities of plaintiff and Mr. Brunson in the former's apartment with high-powered glasses
and he could see clearly (T-102) and that he was well
neq nainted with the layout of the apartment. Yet, under
cross-t•xnmination, the detective admitted the following
things about the apartment, the activities of plaintiff and
Mr. Brunson:

siiiiH'd

1

(1) That from his observation place he could not see
the front door of the apartment house in which plaintiff
lin•<l nor could he see the door that entered into plaintiff's apartment (T-100, T-120);
(2) He could not see the front of the apartment
honsp at 64 "F" Street (T-118, T-120);
(3) He did not know there was a back entrance and
exit to the apartment of plaintiff (T-119) even though
he rlaimed to have thoroughly acquainted himself with
tlw apartment house at 64 "F" Street and with plaintiff's
apartment:
( 4) He did not know the layout of plaintiff's apart-

ment even though he watched it continually for two
weeks (T-122);
( j) That it would have been possible for someone to
walk out of plaintiff's apartment and out the front door

9
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of the apartment house without him or his companion
having knowledge of it (T-113);
( 6) He is .not sure that no one entered or left the
apartment- all he can say is he did not see anyone do
so (T-123);
(7) There were two bedrooms in plaintiff's apartment because he could see lights on in both (T-122);
( 8) He didn't know where the minor child of the
parties slept (T-123);
(9) That it is possible that Mr. Brunson could have
been in the apartment without him knowing it (T-131);

(10) That he knew where plaintiff's bedroom was
situated when in fact he didn't know at all (T-104, T-165);
(11) That he doesn't know or have any idea how
many times plaintiff left the apartment and entered the
apartment with the minor child (T-133, 134) yet, this was
one of the important aspects of his surveillance;
(12) Although he could see clearly into the apartment he could not tell whether Mr. Brunson was taking a
bath or shower in the bathroom of plaintiff's apartment
even though it is usual for one taking a shower to stand
and for one taking a bath to sit (T-103);
( 13) Nor could he tell the type or eolor of clothing
worn by plaintiff (T-106, T-172);
10
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(14) He indicates that plaintiff and Mr. Brunson

were the sole occupants of the apartment between the
dates of December 27, 1962- January 14, 1963 (T-97-137),
yd \[ rs. I\:atherine Sheehy, mother of the plaintiff, was
in Salt Lake. City between those two dates and stayed
oven1ight at plaintiff's apartment (T-187) and Detective Romano did not see her or was not aware of her
pn•Rcnrc in the apartment, and;
(1:>) He indicated that he had made a thorough examination of the back yard at 64 "F" Street and there
wns no way out in that direction (T-124), when in fact a
haek way out was in common use at the time by children
in the neighborhood (T-124, 173).

It seems apparent that Mr. Romano actually knew
about what the physical setup was of plaintiff's
apartment, or what plaintiff's activities were. He knew
just as little about the activities of plaintiff and Leo Brunson during the two-week period and yet this investigation
and tesitmony was crucial in establishing by a clear preponderance of the evidence the act of adultery by plaintiff. The inconsistencies a.nd lack of knowledge and understanding in the detective's testimony is apparent and
this, coupled "·ith the fact that the evidence of hired detectives will be subject to careful scrutiny by the Courts,
since the detectives may be prejudiced in favor of proving what they are employed to prove, Sargent v. Sargent,
114 ..:\. 428 (N. J. Ch.); Fontana v. Fontana, 182 App.
Div. 117, 170 NYS. 308; Steele v. Steele, 170 N.Y.S. 454;
Steu·art v. Stewart, 85 Pa.. Super. 39; Ovenu v. Ovenu,
Y<:ry little

11
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Supra; German v. German, Supra; Diehl v. Diehl, Supra,
leaves one with no alternative but to cast serious doubt
upon the reliability of the detective's testimony.
On the basis of the testimony and the evidence in
the record, plaintiff urges that as far as the adultery finding is concerned, that the evidence is reasonably susceptible to interpretation as to her guilt or innocence in that
there were two bedrooms in her apartment and it is reasonable to find that Mr. Brunson slept in a bedroom other
than the one occupied by plaintiff; it is entirely reasonable to conclude that Mr. Brunson left the apartment unseen by Mr. Romano and his companion, and inasmuch
as the detectives claimed they could see clearly into plaintiff's apartment yet they could not see clearly enough to
ascertain whether Mr. Brunson was taking a shower or
a bath, showing that their view into the apartment was
anything but clear, and inasmuch as plaintiff's conduct
is open either to an interpretation of guilt or innocence,
the presumption of innocence prevails and the Court
should order the striking of the finding of adultery and
hence that of cruelty. It should he noted here that plaintiff has consistently denied that she and Mr. Brunson ever
committed the act of adultery.
However, even if it is believed that plaintiff did in
fact commit adultery, it should be noted by this Court
that on the basis of the record such act would have occurred sometime between December 27, 1962, and January 14, 1963. Not that any such act is ever justified,
but as far as this action is concerned and using such conduct of plaintiff by defendant as grounds for divorce as
12
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(·aw-:ing- him gr<>at emotional distn'ss, anguish, and upset,
it should be pointed out and considered by this Court
that such action occurred at a time when the marriage
ltnd, for all intents and purposes, ended and the relationship hdwt't'll plaintiff and defendant was beyond saving
st•n•ra 1 months before, and that the prior conduct of defemlnnt toward plaintiff was undoubtedly a factor in
bringing about plaintiff's later conduct. Certainly, defendant felt that the marriage was ended long before the
deerPP of divorce was granted by Judge Day on April19,
I !)(i:~, because l\Ir. Dearden did not think it improper to
date a young lady from Richfield at least 6 weeks before
the trial of the divorce action.
It should also be pointed out with some emphasis and
gin.•n due consideration by this Court that plaintiff had
been encouraged by defendant and led by necessity to
work in order to meet the family obligations and to
acquire a home with the furniture, fixtures, and effects
}Wrtinent thereto; and that defendant, during the course
of the marriage, drove a truck on the Fillmore-St. George
and Fillmore-Salt Lake runs and by reason of their both
\Hnking, the parties did not spend much time together
nor did they see each other very often. None of these
rirrumstances may be a justification for the conduct of
either party, but they do point out possible and maybe
probable reasons for the deterioration of this marriage
starting with the birth of the child until its culmination
with this divorce action.

Other than the adultery allegedly and supposedly
rommitted during December and January, the only tes-
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timony relating to misconduct during the time that the
marriage was supposed to be valid and effective was
that of Kenneth William Brunson (T-143-149), wherein
he claimed to have discovered plaintiff and Leo Brunson
in the basement of the Cafe Ilene during the deer hunt
which would have been in Octo her or November of 1962.
However, the evidence was uncontroverted that Mrs.
Dearden was not employed there at that time and hadn't
been for some six weeks to two months prior to that time.
The occasion related by the witness seems either to have
been a figment of his own imagination or that of someone
else's imagination which he brought into court and related by rote to assist the defendant in this matter. A reading of that portion of the transcript relating to this witness's testimony reveals that he did not know what he
was talking about and that the obtaining of such a witness to testify on behalf of the defendant for the sole
purpose of injurying the plaintiff should cast some serious doubts on every aspect of the defendant's case.
On the basis of the record and transcript in this matter, the argument set forth in this Brief, the cases cited
therein, and upon the equities in this matter, plaintiff
prays that the decree of the trial court be reversed and
that it be ordered that plaintiff be granted a decree of
divorce in her favor and against defendant as per her
Complaint heretofore filed in the District Court.
POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ITS FAlLURE TO GRANT PLAINTIFF THE CUSTODY
14
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OF THE :MINOR CHILD OF THE PARTIES
SUBJECT TO DEFENDANT'S RIGHT OF
REASONABLE VISITATION .

.

Plaintiff incorporates into Point II the facts, law,
mHl argument set forth in Point I herein, and especially
the portion relating to the Court's finding of adultery.
The Trial Court's finding in relation to the custody
of the minor child is as follows: "lla. That plaintiff is
and has been a neat and orderly housekeeper and there is
no evidence that she has directly or intentionally mistreated the child. That on the other hand her actions and
treatment of the child have not been for its best interests
or welfare.''
The finding under paragraph 15 was that defendant
\Yas a fit and proper person to have custody of the child
and that plaintiff was not and that the best interests of
the child required that she be given to defendant in order
that his parents could keep her.
It is significant to review the uncontroverted evidence in the transcript relating to plaintiff's care and
treatment of the child, her love for it and the child's love
for her mother and the environment of the child in the
apartment of the plaintiff. The testimony shows that during the course of the marriage, defendant chided plaintiff
for the way she cared for the child because he thought
his wife spent too much money on keeping the little girl
clothed. Defendant's mother testified that she was sure
the little girl loved her mother and that plaintiff loved
the child and that the last information she had plaintiff
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was a wonderful mother and housekeeper (T-159). Katherine Sheehy, mother of plaintiff, said that her daughter
was a good housekeeper and mother, that she loved her
child and that the child wants to he with her mother
(T-189). Rosalie Phillips, an acquaintance of plaintiff's,
asserted that plaintiff is an immaculate housekeeper and
that Julie, her little girl, means more to her than anything else in the world (T-191, 192). The testimony of
Cherie Watts is essentially the same as the others (T-193,
194, 195), as is that of Dorothy Carter who testified that
she thought it would be in the best interests of the child
to remain with her mother (T-196, 197) as did Jeri
Sheehy ( T -195, 196). There is, of course, the testimony
of plaintiff that she loves her child and desires to have
her and that the little child loves her mother. On the
other hand, we find that the father has so little concern for his little daughter that he did not take or send
her any birthday gift nor did he take her any Christmas
gift, even though he knew that the child was in Delta and
he went there to deliver gifts to friends. Mr. and Mrs.
Dearden, the mother and father of defendant, who both
profess to love Julie Dearden as one of their own, could
not :find the time or did not :find it to delight the little
two-year-old with a present from grandmother and
grandfather at Christmas time (T-156-163). The finding then that plaintiff was not a :fit and proper person to
have custody of the child could not have been based upon
any neglect of the plaintiff for her failure to provide for
her physical needs or for love and affection because the
record shows the contrary. The only other reason for her
unfitness would have to he the alleged adultery.
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Plaintiff testified that while she occupied the apartnwnt at (i-! "F'' Street in Salt Lake City, her child, who
wa~ t't•d, bathed and put to bed after she returned home
t•aeh nig-ht, slept in a crib in a separate room with the door
clmwd (T-167). Based on all the testimony taken at the
trial then• is no evidence that plaintiff was immoral or
indi~ereet in the presence of the child or in the sight of
t hL' child unless, as the court said in Smith v. Smith, 9 U.
:!d L)7, 159 (1959) it be immorality or indiscretion to
permit a man to visit her after the marriage for all intents mHl purposes was an impotent and ended circum~tanee. And as the court said further,

\Ve think such visitation without any further evidence of any indiscretion indulged in the presence
or sight of her children, cannot brand her as being
an unfit mother to have custody of her own child n'll, and absent such evidence, the presumption
that she was a fit and proper person calls upon us
to send this case back with instructions to enter a
finding of fact to the effect that plaintiff here is a
fit and proper person to have custody under the
conditions of the decree as we have construed it.
A further examination of the transcript fails to indicate that if plaintiff were indiscreet or immoral she intends to be so in the presence or sight of her child.

The law seems to be that a divorced mother has no
nbsolute right to custody of minor children, but that all
things being equal, preference should be given to the
mother in awarding custody of a child of tender years,
notwithstanding the divorce is granted to the father.
Stcipcr Y. Steiger, 4 U. 2d 273, 293 P. 2d 418 (1956). In
that case, defendant husband was awarded a decree of
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divorce on the grounds of mental cruelty and was also
awarded temporary custody of the three-year-old boy of
the parties. On appeal it was held that evidence that
plaintiff wife drank intoxicating liquor two or three times
to a point of intoxication, that she frequently was seen
with a man other than her husband, and that she was not
a good housekeeper failed to establish that she was unfit
to have the custody of the three-year-old child of the parties, and especially where such evidence came from defendant husband's witness and where it appeared that
plaintiff's love for the child had caused her to work to
provide for him, had caused her to spend her free time
with him and had caused her to fight for his custody.
One of the chief complaints of defendant in the instant case is that Julie Dearden was shuttled around to
babysitters because plaintiff had to work to provide for
her and how much better off the child would be with
his parents. However, plaintiff's fitness to have the child
is revealed in her working to provide for the minor, the
spending of her free time with the baby and the fight
plaintiff is putting up for custody. As the court said in
Briggs v. Briggs, 111 U. 418, 181 P. 2d 223 (1947), ordinarily no one can take the place of a mother in the life of
a girl of that age.
The cases are unanimous in declaring that a child
of tender years should he awarded to its divorced mother
unless she is grossly immoral or subjects the child to
abuse or gross neglect, provided she is in other respects
at least a fairly good parent. Phillips v. Phillips, 175 Or.
14, 149 P. 2d 967; Richardson v. Richardson, 182 Or. 141,
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186 P. 2d 398, and further that the custody of little girls
should not be taken from their mother in a divorce suit
t>X<'l'pt for the most cogent reasons. Claude v. Claude, 180
Or. 62, 17-!: P. 2d 179.
At least one court has said that infatuation with a
man other than her husband, and even adultery, if not
promiscuous, does not necessarily mean that a mother
should be deprived of the custody of a child of tender
years. Martin v. Martin, 27 Wash. 2d 308, 178 P. 2d 284 .
.\nd it 'vas said in 1Yilson v. Wilson, 199 Or. 263, 260 P.
~d 952, that moral unfitness within the rule that a child
of tender years should be awarded to the custody of its
mothC'r, notwithstanding she is the losing party in a di\'orre action, unless she is morally unfit, must be such as
to luwe n direct bearing upon the welfare of the child, and
the test is whether the mother's conduct is so depraved,
immoral, and wicked that to permit her child to remain
in her custody would be injurious to the best interests of
the child. In this same vein, see also Leverich v. Leverirh, 175 Or. 174, 152 P. 2d 303.
Plaintiff denies that she has had any sexual relationship with any man other than her husband and as
indicated herein the presumption of innocence in that
reg-ard should be applicable. However, even if the court
belien's that there is no question that plaintiff has committed adultery as claimed by defendant, there is no justification for holding that the commission of that act alone
has had any injurious affect on the child or its welfare.
A far more important consideration it seems is that the
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alleged conduct of plaintiff that is supposedly contra to
the best interests and welfare of the child supposedly
occurred on December 1962 and January 1963. There is
absolutely no evidence of any misconduct on the part of
plaintiff thereafter and, in fact, plaintiff specifically denies having even seen Leo Brunson for a month before the
trial and that she did not know of his whereabouts
(T-178). Mr. Romano indicates that he saw plaintiff
and Mr. Brunson together in an automobile in Salt Lake
City on March 31. Again, even if it is believed that plaintiff did in fact ride with Mr. Brunson on the date indicated, it may well have been an indiscreet thing to do, as
was her other conduct, but certainly it does not show that
she has committed adultery or that she is so morally
depraved that her conduct is injurious to the welfare of
her child.
The question of the fitness of the parent to have custody of a minor child refers to his or her fitness at the
time of hearing and one court has held that misconduct
of the wife that took place after the parties had separated and after the commencement of the divorce action
was immaterial to the determination of the issue of
whether such misconduct rendered her unfit to have custody of a minor child. Revier r. Revier, 48 Wash. 2d 231,
292 P. 2d 861. Certainly there has been no showing that
in February, March, or April plaintiff was guilty of the,
misconduct she was accused of having committed in December and J anua.ry and there is no showing or reason
tp infer that if she was guilty of the misconduct in January she would continue to be.
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It seems that the reason defendant thinks that plaintiff i~ unfit to have custody of the child is that the little
.~i rl had to be tended by a babysitter during the day
while the mother worked. This, we think, is no basis for
unfitness been mw it relates to plaintiff's financial status
and that alone is not sufficient to justify an award of
<'ll~tody. lVhite v. White, 160 Kan. 32, 159 P. 2d 461;
Jo·nes v. Jones, 23 Wash. 2d 657, 161 P. 2d 890. Apparently, what is required for the best interests of the minor
iH not the ideal situation, but after a balancing of many
fad or~, what then will be for the child's best interest. The
factors generally considered are reasonable permanency
of address, opportunity to develop friendships, schoolmates and playmates, and continued attendance at acces8ihle schoolR, churches and recreational facilities. Emerson v. Quinn, 79 Idaho 358, 317 P. 2d 344; Briggs v.
Uripqs, supra.
The child in the instant case is so young that at this
tinw the usual considerations are not quite so important
as that of the child being with her mother, and the important factor here is that the minor is a little girl, two
~-('ars of age, who at this point needs the care, attention,
and affection of her mother and from every indication
shr has received that from plaintiff and will continue
to do so.
To deprive plaintiff of the custody of this child un:der
the facts of this c.ase is to punish plaintiff for past conduct and hence is punishment for the child. Nye v. Nye,
411 Ill. 408, 105 N.E. 2d 300.
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As the Courts have said in wrestling with child
custody in divorce actions, the child's welfare and not the
shortcomings of the parent is determinative of right of
custody. Newell v. Newell, 146 Cal. App. 2d 166, 303 P.
2d 839; and again, custody of children in divorce cases
must always be determined upon the basis of the children's welfare and cannot he used as a means of punishment or reward of either parent. KalotttSek v. Kalousek,
77 Idaho 433, 293 P. 2d 953.
CONCLUSION
Appellant urges upon the Court that based upon the
testimony at the trial of the divorce action defendant did in fact treat plaintiff in a cruel manner causing
her great emotional upset and the defendant's conduct led
to the separation of the parties and the ultimate dissolution of their marriage relationship. The finding of commission of the act of adultery by plaintiff is not supported
by the evidence and after viewing the evidence most favorable to defendant and against plaintiff on that point,
at the very least the evidence is susceptible of a finding
of either guilt. or innocence on the part of plaintiff and
hence the presumption of her innocence must prevail, and
that the lower court's judgment granting defendant a
decree of divorce in his favor and against plaintiff should
be reversed.
Probably the most important aspect of the case on
review is the custody of Julie Dearden, the minor child of
the parties. After all is said, plaintiff desires that the
custody of the minor child be awarded to her, subject to
the right of reasonable visitation privileges of defendant.
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Plaintiff loves the child and always has and will always
do so. She not only desires to have the child awarded to
itPr, but she needs to have the child as this little girl of
tPmler years needs to be with her mother to be cared for
by her and to receive the love and affection that plaintiff
has for her child and that plaintiff has always been free
to bestow on her.
Julie Dearden is at an age where she needs the care,
comfort, and love of her mother more than she needs
many of the more desired material things of life. But
sinre it is difficult to see the yearning and desire of a
two-year-old girl for the companionship of her mother
nnd it is easy to see a new dress or a bright shiny pair
of shoes, often the former is not given its proper weight
in considering the matter. It is better for Julie Dearden
to be with her mother who loves her and wants her in the
home she provides for her than to be with the grandparents in their spacious home in Fillmore.
Appellant respectfully prays and requests the Court
to reverse in part the trial Court's decision and to award
plaintiff the custody of the minor child, subject to the
right of defendant to reasonable visitation of his
daughter.
Respectfully submitted,
KIPP AND CHARLIER
D. GARY CHRISTIAN
516 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff
and Appellant
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